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THE IMPACT  OF  THE POTENTIAL DURATION OF  UNEMPLOYMENT  BENEFITS 
ON  THE DURATION OF  UNEMPLOYMENT 
ABSTRACT 
This paper uses two data sets to examine the impact  of the potential 
duration of  unemployment  insurance  (UI) benefits  on  the duration  of 
unemployment  and the time pattern of the escape  rate from unemployment  in  the 
United  States.  The first part of  the empirical work uaea a large sample of 
household heads to examine differences in  the unemployment  spell diatributiona 
of UI  recipients  and nonrecipients.  Sharp increases  in the rare of escape 
from unemployment  both through recalla and new job acceptances  are apparent 
for UI recipients  around  the time when  benefita  are likely  to lapse.  The 
absence of auch  apikea in  the escape  rate from unemployment  for nonrecipienta 
strongly auggeata  that the potential duration  of  UI benefita  affects firm 
recall policies  and  workers'  willingneaa  to start new jobs.  The second part 
of  our empirical work  uses  administrative  data  to  examine the effects of  the 
level  and length  of  UT benefita  on  the escape rate from unemployment  of UI 
recipients.  The reaults indicate that  a one week increase  in  potential 
benefit  duration  increases the average duration of the unemployment  spells of 
UI recipients  by  0,16  to 0.20  weeks.  The estimatea alao imply that policies 
that extend  the potential  duration of  benefits  increaae the mean  duration  of 
unemployment  by substantially  more  than  policiea  with  the aame predicted 
impact on the total UI budget  that raise  the level of  benefits while  holding 
potential  duration  constant. 
Lawrence  F. Katz  Bruce D. Meyer 
Department  of Economics  Department  of  Economics 
Harvard Univeraity  Northwestern  University 
Cambridge,  MA  02138  Evanston,  Illinois  60208 I.  Introduction 
European  countries with  relatively generous unemployment 
insurance  (UI)  systems (such as Belgium, France, Germany,  the 
Netherlands, and  the  United Kingdom) have suffered  much larger and 
more persistent  increases in unemployment  in the  1980's than the 
United States.  These differences in European  and U.S. unemployment 
experience  are largely explained by the  substantially  longer duration 
of unemployment  spells in Europe.  Furthermore, much microeconomic 
evidence indicates  that there is a positive  relation between the 
level of UI benefits  received  and the  duration  of the  unemployment 
spells of UI recipients.1  These observations have  generated much 
interest among hoth academics  (e.g.  Minford,  1985) and the press 
(e.g.  The  Economist,  14-20 May 1988,  p.69) in the hypnthesis  that 
work disincentives  arising from generous unemployment  insurance  (UI) 
systems play  an important role in high and persistent  European 
unemployment  in the 1980's. 
Burda (1988) provides  some suggestive evidence  that differences 
in the generosity  of UT systems may help  explain cross-country 
differences in unemployment performance.  Burda  finds a strong 
positive  correlation  (of  0.63) between  a measure of  the  generosity  of 
UI benefits  available  to a fully insured worker  and the  ratio of 
long-term unemployment  to the labor force for fourteen OECO countries 
1 
See,  for  example,  Glassen  (1977)  and Solon  (1985) for estimates 
of the  impact of benefit levels on spell duration  in the United 
Stares, and Atkinson  et al.  (1984) and Narendranathan  at ml.  (1985) 
for estimates  for the  United 
Kingdom. 2 
in 1985.2  On  the  other hand, Burtless  (1987) argues persuasively 
that European UI systems were generous well before  the rise in 
European unemployment.  Many European etonomies with very  generous 
benefits had much lower unemployment than the less generous U.S.  in 
ihe 1960's.  Still, typical unemployment spell durations have  tended 
to he quite long in economies with liberal UI systems even in petiods 
of relatively  low unemployment.  A key issue prior to the debate over 
the impacts of UI system generosity on aggregate unemployment  is 
whether there is microeconomic  evidence consistent  with the key  link 
in the macroeconomic  argument  that observed  differences  in UI systems 
csn help  explain substantial cross-country  differences  in the 
duration  of unemployment. 
In comparing  the  UI system in the  U.S. with  those in Europe,  the 
major differences  appear to be in the  potential  duration  of benefits 
and eligibility requirements  for benefits  rather than in the weekly 
benefits  level for qualified workers.  In particular,  insurance  and 
other assistsnce  lasts for more than twice as long in most European 
countries than in the United  States.  The potential  duration  of 
benefits varies  dramatically across countries.  The  typical qualified 
worker is eligible  for 6  months of benefits  in the  U.S. versus over a 
28urda classifies  as  long-term unemployed  those unemployed 
workers with current spells of 12 months or longer.  The UI measure 
constructed by Burda combines  information on  the  level of benefits, 
average manufacturing  earnings, and the maximum duration  of benefits. 
Burds's measure is the present discounted value  (using a 10 percent 
discount rate) of the maximum number of weeks  of benefits  available 
to  an insured worker relative  to the average weekly  earnings  for a 
manufacturing  worker.  This measure ignores taxes and  substantial 
differences across countries  in eligibility  requirements  for UI. 
These differences  in eligibility rules generate  substantial variation 
in the  fraction of the unemployed covered by UI across countries. 3 
year of benefita  in the France, Germany,  and Sweden (Burtleas,  1987). 
In fact,  benefita  can laat indefinitely  (at  a reduced rate after the 
firat year) for aome individuala  in Belgium and the United  Kingdom 
(Eaeraon, 1988).  UI benefita  that laat for a long duration  combined 
with limited monitoring  of aearch effort may make an economy more 
ausceptible  to  increaaea  in long-term unemployment  in the face of 
adverae ahocks. 
While much microeconomic  reaearch haa ahown that higher levela of 
benefita  are aasociated with  longer durationa of unemployment,  there 
ia much leaa empirical reaearch  on the impacta of the potential 
duration of benefita  on the  duration of unemployment.3  Since 
differencea in the length of available benefita  are  the  key 
difference among UI syatema,  an underatanding  of how potential 
benefit duration  affecta the diarribution of unemployment  apella ia 
crucial for determining whether UI differencea help explain cross- 
country differencea  in unemployment. 
In thia paper, we preaent new empirical evidence  on the  impact of 
the  level and potential  duration of benefita on the duration  of 
unemployment  in United  Statea.  Since the proapect  of rehire by one'a 
previoua employer  ia important  for a substantial  fraction  of UI 
recipienta  in the U.S.,4  we examine the impact of UI benefita  on 
3Moffitt and Nicholaon  (1982),  Moffitt (1985), and Ham  and Rem 
(1987) are  among the few sophiaricated  econometric  studiea of  the 
impact of potential  benefit duration on the duration  of unemployment. 
4For example,  Katz and Meyer  (1988) found that 75 percent of a 
large aample of UI recipienta  from Miaaouri  and Pennaylvania  in 1979- 
8G indicated when they filed for UI benefita  that they expected  to be 
recalled by their previoua  employer. firm's recall policea  aa well as on worker new job acceptance 
behavior. 
- 
We  look at two types of empirical evidence.  The first part of our 
empirical work  involves  an analysis  of the  unemployment  spells of a 
sample of household  heads  from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
These data allow us to compare spell distributions  for UI recipients 
and nonrecipients  and to look at differences  in the  time pattern of 
recalls and the acceptances of new jobs.  We find big differences  in 
the  distribution  of spell durations  for UI recipients  and 
nontecipients.  Sharp increases in both  the  recall and new job 
finding rates ate apparent at durations when benefits  are likely to 
lapse for UI recipients.  The absence of such  increases in the escape 
rate from unemployment  for  nonrecipients  provides  strong evidence  of 
an impact of the potential duration of UI benefits  on firm recall 
policies  and workers'  willingness  to start new jobs. 
The second part  of out  empirical work examines  the impact of the 
level and length of UI benefits  on the  escape tate from unemployment 
for  a large sample of UI recipients.  This Continuous  Wage and 
Benefit History  (CWBH) data set, extracted by Hoffitt  (1985a), has 
the  advantage  of providing detailed  administrative  records on the UI 
system parameters  facing individuals.  Since  the  data set covets 
spells in 12 states during the  1978-83 period,  a fair amount of both 
cross-section  and time series variation  in UI parameters  is 
available.  This variation  allows us  to directly estimate  impacts on 
the  escape rate from unemployment of differences  in the  level and 
length of benefits  and test the  predictions  of alternative models. S 
We utilize  these estimates  to  simulate the  impact of changes  in the 
level and maximum duration of benefits  on the  mean duration  of 
unemployment,  the fraction of workers exhausting benefits,  and 
expected  expenditure  on UI benefits  per compensated unemployment 
spell. 
The remainder  of the  paper is organized as follows.  Section II 
reviews several alternative theoretical models of the effects of UI 
system parameters  on the  probability  of leaving unemployment. 
Section III presents  our comparison of the unemployment  spella of UI 
recipients  and nonrecipients.  Section  IV applies econometric 
duration models  to administrative  data on the spells of UI 
recipients,  and section  V presents  simulations using these estimates. 
Section VI provides  some concluding remarks. 
II.  Theoretical  Background 
In this section, we analyze  the  likely impacts of the level and 
potential  duration  of unemployment benefits  on duration  of 
unemployment  and the time pattern of the  escape rate from 
unemployment.  We discuss  the  predictions of three types of models 
(1)  a standard  job search model;  (2) job search models that 
incorporate the layoff-rehire  process;  and  (3)  a static labor-leisure 
choice model. 
Standard  Job  Search Model with no Recalls 
Mortensen  (1977) utilizes  a dynamic search model with no recall 6 
possibility, variable  search intensity, a stationary known wage  offer 
distribution,  and  a constant  arrival rate of job offers  (for a given 
search intensity)  to analyze the effects of UT on the escape rate 
from unemployment.  Mortensen  incorporares two key  features  of the UI 
system in the United  States into the model: benefits  are assursed  to 
be paid only for a specified duration  rather than in every period of 
an unemployment  spell, and new entrants or workers who  quit joba  are 
not qualified  for benefits.5 
As the remaining number of weeks  of benefits  available  to a 
qualified  unemployed worker decreases,  the  value of remaining 
unemployed  also decreases.  This drop causes the  reservation  wage to 
fall and search intensity  to  increase as  an individual geta closer to 
when benefits  lapse.  These changes in behavior  imply that the escape 
rate from unemployment  rises until the date of benefit exhaustion. 
After exhaustion,  the hazard rate is constant  given the assumption 
that the  environment  is stationary.  The time pattern of  the  hazard 
rate for an unemployed worker  initially qualified  for  UI benefits 
with potential  duration  of P0 periods is illustrated by  the  solid 
line in Figure lA.6  If individuals can locate jobs  and arrange not 
to begin work until their benefits  run out, one might observe  a 
discrete  increase  in the escape tate near  the  point of benefits 
exhaustion  followed by a discrete  drop after exhaustion. 
Mortensen's model suggests  that changes in the level and length 
5See Burdett  (1979) for an analysis of a similar model. 
6The figure is drawn assuming  the marginal  utility of leisure  is 
independent of income. of benefits  have two opposing  influences on the escape rate from 
unemployment.  Increases  in either of the benefit parameters  have 
the stsndard  disincentive  effect of raising the value  of being 
unemployed,  but these increases  also raise the value  of being 
employed by increasing the utility associated with being  laid off in 
the future.  The second effect, known as  the  "entitlement"  effect, 
raises the escape rate from unemployment  for workers who currently  do 
not qualify for benefits  and for qualified workers close to 
exhaustion. 
The effect of an increase  in the  potential  duration of benefits 
from P0 to P1  is illustrated  in Figure 1A.  The  standard disincentive 
effect reduces  the  escape rate from unemployment  for a newly  laid-off 
worker, but  the  entitlement  effect leads to a higher  escape rate as 
one  approaches  and passes the exhaustion point.  The  impact of an 
increase  in the  benefit level from b0 to b1 is illustrated  in Figure 
lB. 
The model  suggests  the  following  stylized, reduced-form 
apecification  for the  escape rate from unemployment,  A: 
+  -  +  - 
A  = A(  P,  P-t,  b,  b*(P-t),  K)  for P-c ￿ 0, 
where t  is the duration  of the  apell,  P  is potential  duration  of 
benefits,  P-t  is time until exhaustion, b is the level of benefits, 
and X is a vector of individual and labor market variables  affecting 
the  arrival rate of job offers, search intensity, and choice of 
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time  until exhaustion  declines.  Higher benefits  reduce the escape 
rate when time until exhaustion is high and increase  the escape  rate 
at around exhaustion.  Since the  entitlement  effect is  likely to he 
small relative  to the standard  search subsidy effect, the average 
duration  unemployment  is likely to rise with increases  in both  the 
level and potential  duration  of benefits. 
Recall  Prosoects, UI Benefits,  and Unemoloyment  Soell Duration 
The  standard job  search model is not entirely  appropriate  for 
analyzing  the unemployment  durations  of workers on layoff with some 
possibility  of recall.  Ihe interpretation  of empirical  evidence  on 
the duration  of insured unemployment  spells in the  U.S.8 requires  a 
consideration  of the role played by recalls since the  majority  of 
insured unemployment  spells appear to end in recall (Katz, 1986a; 
Katz and Meyer,  1988).  The prospect  of recall affects  the 
probability  of leaving unemployment directly  through  the  rate of 
actusl recalls and indirectly by affecting worker  search behavior. 
Katz  (1986a) extends  a standard model of jab search to include an 
exogenous  probability  of recall.9  He shows that under reasonable 
7There are many reasons unrelated  to UI that might generate a 
direct effect of spell duration  on the hazard rate.  Empirically, one 
csnnot separate  out the independent effects of duration,  time until 
exhaustion, and potential benefit duration  for s sample containing 
only insured unemployment  spells if P  is fixed during all  spells 
since t,  P-r,  and P are perfectly collinesr. 
majority  of insured unemployment spells in Canada also end in 
recall by the previous  employer.  See-Robertson  (1988). 
9Burdett  and Mortensen  (1978) and Pissarides  (1982) also analyze 
job  search models  that incorporate the  possibility  of recalls. conditions  better recall prospects reduce the new job  finding rate by 
raiaing  the  reservation  wage and reducing  the likelihood  of search. 
The statistical model  of unemployment  spell durations  generated 
by the job search models  extended to allow for recalls  is  a competing 
risks model in which unemployment  spells can end either through 
recall or the finding of an acceptable new job.  The predictions  of 
standard job  search models for how variables  affect the escape rate 
from unemployment  really refer to the  new job finding rate and these 
predictions  need not hold for the overall escape rate from 
unemployment  (the sum of the recall and new job  finding races). 
Tnformation on whether  spells end through recall or  the  finding of a 
new job allows an econometrician  to estimate a competing  risks aodel. 
Katz and Meyer  (1988) have analyzed  the unemployment spell  durations 
of a sample of UI recipients  in Missouri using a competing  risks 
approach.  They find that UT recipients who expect  to be recalled 
have much lower new job  finding rates than those who do not expect to 
be recalled,  and that the  new job and recall races have quite 
different  time patterns  and are often correlated  in opposice 
directions with characteristics  of individuals. 
Mortensen  (1987) analyzes  the effects of limited duration  UT 
benefits  in a joint wealth maximizing model of job  separations  that 
incorporates  the  possibility  of temporary layoffs.  Layoffs occur in 
response  to reductions  in match-specific  productivity.  The 
reservation wage decreases  over the  course of an unemployment  spell 
as a worker approaches  benefit exhaustion.  This  induces an 
increasing new job finding rate as  in Mortenaen  (1977) and an 10 
increasing recall rate as well.  Mortenaen  shows that  for realistic 
parameter values most of  the  decline in rhe  reservation  wage should 
occur in the last week or  two  before exhaustion.  The  discrete change 
in the flow value  of being unemployed when benefits  are  exhausted 
yields the prediction  rhat many firms may recall  laid-off workers 
around the benefir exhaustion point and that the  new job  finding rate 
should increase  around exhaustion.  The duration and  incidence of 
unemployment spells are shown to rise with  increases  in the  level and 
length of benefits. 
Unemoloymenr  Soell Duration  in a Sraric Labor-Leisure  Choice Model 
An alternative  approach  is taken by Moffitt  and Nicholson  (1982) 
who use a aratic model where unemployed workers have  preferences  over 
income and unemployment.  Unemployment  is valued because  of its 
leisure component  and because one can search while unemployed.  At 
the  time of job loss, individuals choose income and weeks  of 
unemployment subject to a budget consrrainr.  The budget  constraint 
has  a convex kink at the week of UI exhaustion because  unemployment 
ceases to be subsidized  at this point.  This kink  combined with  a 
continuous distribution  of tastes implies that many people will 
maximize  their utility by rerurning  to work the week benefits  lapse. 
Randomness  in the  job finding procass suggests  a cluster of spells 
ending around rhe  exhaustion  patn.r.. 
Moffitt  and Nicholson  show that increases in rhe level and length 
of benefits  generate  income and subsritution effects which  serve to 
increase  the  mean duration  of unemployment spells.  The  static nature 11 
of the  model makes  it difficult  to translate  its predictions  into a 
hazard model framework.  The key prediction  is  that the escape rate 
from unemployment  should he relatively high near  the exhaustion 
point.  The impacts of increases in the level or length of benefits 
on  the  choice of spell duration roughly translate  into negative 
effects on the hazard rate. 
Summary 
All three models considered suggest that the distribution  of 
unemployment  spell durations should differ for UI recipients  and 
nonrecipients.  UI recipients should display stronger positive 
duration  dependence  in the  new job finding rate than nonrecipients  at 
least up through the point of exhaustion.  One may  also expect to 
find spikes in the escape rate (both through recalls and  the  finding 
of new jobs) near  exhaustion for UI recipients.  Increases  in the 
level and potential  duration of benefits  should increase  the  duration 
of unemployment  spells of UI recipients. 
III.  UI,  Recalls,  and Unemployment  Spells: Evidence  from the  PSID 
Data Description 
In this section,  we compare  the  distributions  of unemployment 
spell durations  of UI recipients and nonrecipients  in the  United 
Stares.  We analyze employer-initiated  unemployment  spells in the 
198D-81 period for a national  sample of household  heads.  The  data 12 
are derived from Waves 14 and 15 of the  Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics  (P510)  .  The  interviews  from  these  two  waves  of  the  P510 
provide  detailed  information  on  each  household  head's  last 
unemployment  spell  at  least  partially  contained  in  the  calendar  year 
preceding  the  interview date.10  For  the last unemployment  spell in 
the calendar year prior to the interview, respondents  provide 
retrospective  information on the spell duration  and the start month 
of the  spell.  We can also determine whether UI benefits  were 
received during the spell, and whether completed  spells ended through 
recall or the taking of a new job. 
The basic sample contains  1115 layoff and plant-closing 
unemployment  spells for household  heads at least 20 and not  greater 
than 65 years old.12  This data set  has two  major advantages.  First, 
lDThe questions  concerning  individual unemployment  spells were 
only asked of household  heads who were labor force participants  at 
the  time of the interview.  Individual unemployment  spell  infotmation 
is not available  for other household members. 
1The P510 allows one  to distinguish among job separations 
arising from quits, plant closings,  and other employer-initiated 
separations  (layoffs and firings).  The P510 does not distinguish 
between separations  initiated through layoffs and through firings 
(discharges for cause) 
household  head's last spell from the calendar year prior  to 
the interview  date made  it into the sample if  (1)  the spell ended in 
recall to the  pre-separation  employer;  (2)  the spell ended in the 
taking of a new job and the head was  separated from his  or her  last 
job by a plant closing,  layoff, or firing;  (3)  the spell is  censored 
at the interview date and  the head  is categorized  as  on temporary 
layoff; or (4)  the spell is censored at the interview  date and the 
head  is  categorized as unemployed having been  separated  from last job 
by plant closing,  layoff or firing.  Observations  satisfying  the 
above criteria were deleted from the  sample if they had missing 
information on pre-separation  industry, occupation, spell duration, 
spell start date, or UI receipt.  An observation was also deleted  if 
the head at the  time of the interview was not  the  head in  the 
previous year. 13 
it contains  a large sample of spells for both UI recipients  and 
nonrecipienta,  and contains  information on complete unemployment 
spells rather thsn just compensated unemployment.  UI benefits  were 
received  during some part of the  spell for 63 percent of  the 
observations  (703 spells) 
.  Most  studies of the impact of 
unemployment  insurance utilize data sets containing only UI 
recipients  and only information on weeks of compensated 
unemploymentJ3  Second, our data set allows us  to  separate  the 
escape rate from unemployment  into its component parts:  the  new job 
finding rste and the recall rate.  The ability to separate new job 
acceptances from recalls  is  important since the impacts of UI on job 
search behsvior  predicted by standard  search models  refet to  the  new 
job  finding rste and do not necessarily  translate  into predictions 
for the total escape rate in samples where  recalls  are  important. 
The PSID  data set also has  several disadvantages.  First, 
information  is only available  on whether UI is received  at sometime 
during a spell.  One cannot identify the level or potential  duration 
of the benefits  available.  Second, response biases  for retrospective 
information  on individual unemployment spells can be severe. 
Mathiowetz  and Duncan  (1968) find in a study of response bias  in 
retrospective  answers  to unemployment questions  similar to those 
found in the PSID that short spells tend to be underreported  and that 
the reported  start and end dates of spells are often quite 
inaccurate.  It is unclear whether this type of response  bias 
distorts  comparisons  of the  distribution of spell durations  for UI 
13Ehrenberg and Oaxsca (1976) is  an important exception. 14 
recipients and nonrecipients.  Third, the sampling  frame selects  the 
last unemployment  spell at least pactially  contained  in a calendac 
year  and does not  generate a random sample of spells.  Katz  (l986a) 
analyzes  the  biases introduced by this sampling frame and determines 
that they are unlikely  to be substantial.14  While  this data  set is 
far  from perfect,  it does provide a rare opportunity  to look  at 
whether  the  time patterns  of the overall escape rate, the  recall 
rate, and new job finding tate differ for  insured and uninsured 
unemployment  spells.  The impact of variation  in UI system parametets 
on the total escape rate from unemployment is analyzed  using high 
quality administrative  data on compensated unemployment  spells in 
section IV. 
Basic descriptive  statistics  for the entire sample, UI 
recipients,  and UI nonrecipients  are  presented  in Table 1.15  The 
importance  of recall for job losets in the U.S.  is highlighted  by  the 
finding that 52 percent of the spells end in recall.16  The recall 
tate is 64 percent for manufacturing  workers,  59 petcent for 
14Furthetmoce,  the  analysis presented  in this section has been 
repeated on a sub-sample  containing only spells that began  in the 
fourth quartet of 1980 or the fourth quarter of 1981,  This sampling 
frame comes close to approximating  a random sample of  the  inflow of 
the  relevant population  into unemployment  since few workers 
experience multiple  spells in a quarter.  The qualitative  results ste 
quite similar when  this altecnstive  sampling scheme is used. 
t5The PSID overssmples  low income households.  The extremely 
high nonwhite proportion  of nonwhites  in the  sample results from this 
sampling  scheme.  The  empirical findings  are  qualitatively  quite 
similar to those presented in this section when only observations 
from the  "random"  (original 5KG cross-section)  sample ste used. 
is likely that this is an underestimate  of  the  recall tate 
for  this sample since some of  the  spells censored at  the  interview 





Table  1:  Descriptive  Statistics  for P510  Unemployment  Spell  Sample 
UI  Recipients  and Nonrecipients 
Unemployment  Spells  Initiated  by Plant  Closings,  Layoffs,  and Firings 
Mean (S.D.) 
Variable  Description  UI=0  1.11=1  Total 
Duration  unemployment  spell  duration  18.64  15.60  16.72 
in  weeks 
Recall  = 1  if  spell  ended in recall  .48  .55  .52 
New Job  — 1  if  spell  ended in taking  .28  .28  .28 
a new job 
Censored  =  1  if  spell  is censored at  .24  .18  .20 
interview  date 
UI  = 1  if  received UI during  .00  1.00  .63 
some part of  spell 
Unemp. rate  county  unemployment  rate  7.09  8.12  7.74 
PC  = 1  if  spell  initiated  by 
plant  closing 
Wage  Average  hourly  earnings  in calendar 
year prior  to interview 
Age  age in  years 
Nonwhite  = 1  if  nonwhite 
Female  = 1  if  female 
Married  = 1  if  married 
Education  years  of schooling 
Mining  = 1  if  in mining  or 
agriculture 
Construct  1 if construction 
Durables  1 if durable goods manufacturing 
Nondurablea  1 if nondurable  goods  .09  .15  .13 
manufacturing 
Transport  — 1  if  transportation  .10  .07  .08 
or  utilities 
Trade  = 1  if  wholesale  or  retail  trade  .16  .08  .11 
Service  =  1  if  services  .24  .14  .18 
White  Collar  —  1  if  managerial,  professional,  .38  .22  .28 
clerical  or sales worker 
































construction  workers,  43 percent  for transportation  workers,  35 
percent for service workers,  and 29 percent for trade workers. 
There are sharp differences  in the  characteristics  of UI 
recipients  and nonrecipients.  UI recipients have much higher wages 
than nonrecipients.  Substantially  larger fractions  of the UI 
recipients  are white, married, male, and manufacturing  workers.  The 
recall rate is  also substantially  higher for UI recipients.  These 
differences  in the  characteristics  of rhe  two  groups help explain  the 
longer mean  spell duration  for nonrecipients.17 
Samole Hazard  Functions for UI  Recioients and hionrecipients 
The  pattern of unemployment  spell durations  for UI recipients  and 
nonrecipients  from the  PSID sample is  illustrated  in Figures 2A and 
28.  The figures plot the  Kaplan-Meier  empirical hazards for the two 
samples with  the weekly duration  data grouped  into two  week intervals 
for ease of presentation.  The overall empirical hazard for a given 
two week period is  the  fraction of spells ongoing at the start oi  the 
period which  end during the  two  week interval.  The recall and new 
job empirical  hazards, plotted for the rwo  samples in Figures 3A and 
38,  are analogously  defined as the fraction  of spells ongoing at  the 
start of a period which end during  the  period through recall and 
17Formal  duration model estimates  reported  in Katz  (l965)  that 
include demographic variables,  industry, occupation, the county 
unemployment  rate, and a plant closing dummy indicate that the 
differences  in the spell durations  for the  two  groups are largely 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































through the finding of a new job respectively.18 
The figures reveal substantial differences  in the  pattern of  the 
escape rate froa unemployment  for  UI recipients  and nonrecipients. 
The  total hszard rates are initially downward sloping for both 
groups.  The total hazard  increases substantially  in the  25  to 40 
week  interval for UI recipients.  There are large spikes in the 
escape rate from unemployment  at 26 weeks and at 39 weeks  for UI 
recipients.  Spikes of similar magnitude  at 26 and 39 weeks  ste not 
apparent  for UI nonrecipients.  While the exact placing of the spikes 
may be an artifact  of  the  tendency  for  individuals to report long 
unemployment rates as lasting exactly half a year, three quartets,  or 
one year (Sider, 1985), the  much greater importance  of these spikes 
for UI recipients  strongly suggests that they may be related  to the 
limited duration  of UI benefits.  Most UI recipients  during this 
period were  eligible  for either 26  or 39 weeks of benefits  in a 
benefit year.  The escape tate from unemployment  appears  to  increase 
substantially  around when many UI recipients would be exhausting 
benefits  and a much smaller increase in the escape rate is  apparent 
for nonrecipients. 
The  total hazard  rates presented in Figures 2A and 28 mask sharp 
differences in the new job finding and recall rates illustrated  in 
Figures 3A and 38.  The recall hazard drops sharply with spell 
duration  for  both UI recipients and nonrecipients.  Most recalls 
occur within  8  weeks of  the  start date of a spell.  The new job 
18The data behind  the  plots are  presented  in Appendix  Tables Al 
and A2. 17 
finding rate diffeta aubatantially  for  UI recipients  and 
nonrecipients.  The new job  finding rate starts out quite a bit lower 
and is much more upward sloping for UI recipients.  The  lower initial 
new job finding rate for UI recipients may be an artifact  of the one 
week waiting period before UI eligibility  in most  states. 
Individuals  expecting  quite short spells may also not bother  to  apply 
for  benefits.  On the other hand,  these factors could not plausibly 
account for the differences  in the  new job finding rate patterns  for 
UI recipients  and nonrecipients  after the first few weeks.  The low 
initial new job finding rate and apparent positive  duration 
dependence  in the new job finding rate for UI  recipients  provides 
support for the prediction  that UI depresses  new job finding when 
time until exhaustion  is large and that the  escape rate rises with 
time until exhaustion.  The jumps in the  recall and new job finding 
rates for UI recipients at likely exhaustion points  (26  and 39 weeks) 
are strong evidence  for  the  prediction  that firms teke  into account 
the duration of UI benefits  in designing recall policies  (as 
suggested by the Mortensen'a  (1987) modeI of  the  impact of limited 
duration  UI  on recall policies) and that workers become much more 
likely to take new jobs  as  their benefits  run out.  The absence of 
such patterns  for nonrecipients  in the PSID sample strongly  suggests 
that these patterns  represent behavioral  responses by firms and 
workers  to the incentives  created by a UI system with  limited benefit 
duration. 
The sample hazard functions  plotted  in the figures do nor take 
into account heterogeneity  among individuals in the sample.  Although 18 
uncontrolled  heterogeneity  biases estimates  of duration  dependence  in 
the  total hazard towards spurious findings  of negative  duration 
dependence,  a bias in the opposite direction  is possible  for an 
individual escape route hazard  in a competing  risks model.  If 
uncontrolled  factors that raise the  recall rate also reduce the  new 
job finding rate, then one can (at  least in theory) generate  spurious 
positive  duration  dependence  in the  new job hazard.19  In fact,  Katz 
(1986a) finds that positive  duration dependence  in the new  job 
finding rare for UI recipients  is more  prevalent when  controls  for 
observables  are included  in formal duration  model estiaaces using 
this PSID data set.  The differences between the escape rates for UI 
recipients  and nonrecipients  and the spikes near exhaustion  points 
for  UI recipients  also remain when we estimate  competing  risks models 
with nonparametric  baseline hazards and controls  for observables  are 
estimated,29  Furthermore,  Katz and Meyer  (1988) find substantial 
increases  in both the recall and the new job finding rates near the 
week of benefits  exhaustion  and find strong positive  duration 
dependence in  the  new job finding rate for a sample of UI recipients 
19Katz  (l986b) shows that the  cooditions  required  for unobserved 
heterogeneity  to lead to a bias  in the direction  of positive  duration 
dependence  in the  new job hazard are quite extreme. 
20Man and Hausman  (1986) have developed  an estimator  to handle 
unobserved  heterogeneity  that is correlated  among the risks in a 
competing risks model.  They have implemented their estimator  on a 
sub-sample of our PSID data set that excludes  spells initiated  by 
plant closings.  Their results indicate that  there is essentially 
zero correlation  among the unobservables  in the  new job and recall 
hazards  and that allowing  for correlated, unobserved  heterogeneity 
does not qualitatively  affect one's inferences for  this data  set. 19 
21  in Missouri. 
IV.  Hazsrd Model Estimates  using the Moffitt Data Set 
This section reports hazard model estimates  of  the  effect of  the 
level and length of UI benefits  on unemployment durations.  We use 
Continuous Wage  and Benefit History  (CWBH) UI administrative  records 
on the compensated unemployment  spells of a sample of 3365 males  from 
twelve states during the  period l97B-l983.  The sample  is  drawn from 
a data set previously  analyzed by Moffitt (l985a) 
22 
CWBH data 
provide accurare  information  for each individual on the level of UI 
benefits  and their potential  duration.  The number of weeks of 
benefit receipt  is  also known exactly.23  This  avoids many of  the 
measurement  error problems  common in other data sources. 
The data set provides enough variation  in UI system parameters 
within and across stares and over rime to get accurate  estimates  of 
the  impact of the level and length of UI benefits  and the time until 
21The Missouri  data set combines UI administrative  records with 
a follow-up survey of UI recipients.  The administrative  records 
allow one  to accurately  date whether a spell ends in the week that 
benefits  lapse. 
22The original  Moffitt  (1985a) data set contains  4&28 
observations.  1,227 observations  are  excluded  because of missing 
data on age,  schooling, dependents  or marital status.  36 
observations are excluded  because the recorded  spell is longer  than 
the reported potential  duration  of benefits. 
23The spells in the Moffitt data are  periods of benefit receipt. 
Spells that are  interrupted by short periods when benefits  are not 
received  are  concatenated.  This modified spell of benefit receipt 
may do a better job of grouping  together periods of similar behavior. 
See Moffirt (l985b)  for  more discussion. 20 
benefit exhaustion.  On  the  other hand, the data set only covers 
compensated  unemployment  so  that one cannot use it to make  inferences 
about what happens  to individuals after benefits  are  exhausted.  The 
data set also does not permit one to identify whether  spells end 
through recall or the finding of a new job.  Thus one  can  only 
analyze the overall unemployment  escape rate. 
The duration  of unemployment  spells is analyzed using  formal 
hazard model techniques.  We use a proportional hazards model 
estimator  that allows for time-varying explanatory variables  and 
which nonparametrically  estimates  the  change in the hazard  over time. 
This  semiparametric  approach  is analyzed  in detail in Meyer  (1986). 
The estimates  are the parameters of a continuous  time hazard model 
and  thus retain a clear interpretation.  Nonparametrically  estimating 
the  change  in the hazard over time eliminates  the need to impose a 
potentially  restrictive  functional form  that has  little theoretical 
justification.  If an incorrect functional  form were  assumed,  all of 
the parameter  esrimares  from the model would be inconsistent.  This 
danger is avoided by nonparametrically  estimating  the baseline 
hazard. 
Formally,  we parameterize  the  overall hazard rare of exit from 
unemployment  for  individual i at time t,  ).(t)  using the 
proportional  hazards form.  Let T.  be the length of individual  i's 
unemployment  spell.  Then the hazard at spell length r is 
(1)  1(r) =  lim  prob[t+h>T.￿i 
h—U  h 
=  A(t)exp{z.(r)  'j3} 21 
where 
1(t) is the baseline  hazard at time t, which  is unknown, 
z.(t)  is a vector  of time dependent explanatory variables  for 
individual  i, and 
9 is a vector of parameters which  is unknown. 
Our  approach  estimates  fi  and  the baseline hazard parameters  y(t) 
using maximum likelihood  techniques, where 
t+l 
(2)  (r) — ln( 
J 1(u)du). 
The effects of unemployment  insurance  are measured  using 
functions  of the benefit  level and the length of benefits.  The  level 
of benefits  and pre-UI  earnings after state and federal taxes are 
used  in the  specifications below.  Similar results are obtained when 
the log of benefits  and earnings  are  used.  We measure the effect of 
an individual's  remaining potential  duration of unemployment  benefits 
on the hazard  rate using the  variables UI  1 to UI 41-54 which  form a 
spline  in the time until benefit exhaustion.  The coefficient  on UI 
2-5 is  the  additional  effect on the hazard of having moved 1 week 
closet  to exhaustion  when one is 2-5  weeks away.  The coefficient  on 
UI  1  is  the additional effect on the hazard when one moves from 2 to 
1 week  from exhaustion.  Thus,  the  effect of moving from 6 weeks away 
to 1 week  is 4  times the UI  2-5  coefficient  plus the UI  1 
coefficient.  The other UI spline coefficients have  analogous 
interpretations. 
Formally,  let r  be the number of weeks until benefits  lapse. 
Then 22 
UI 1  1 if r  — 1, and 
0 otherwise 
UI 2-5 = min(6-r,4)  if r ￿  5,  and 
0 otherwise 
UI 6-10 — min(l1-r,5)  if r ￿  10,  and 
0 otherwise, 
and similarly  for the  remaining  spline variables. 
In some of the  later specifications  the  potential  duration  of 
benefits  is directly  included as an explanatory variable  along with 
the rime until  exhaustion spline.24  In addition,  interaction  terms 
suggested by the thaoretical models reviewed  in section  It  and 
previous  empirical work are  included.  These variables  interact  the 
level of benefits  with  age,  the  unemployment rate, and  the  time until 
exhaustion.  Since benefits  are extended  in the  course of many 
spells,  a variable  is  included which equals  1  in week  t  if anytime 
during a spell it was expected  that benefits would  lapse in week  t. 
This variable  may also pick up  the  possibility  that some individuals 
do not apply for extended benefits  even when  eligible.  The  state 
unemployment  rate variable  used  in the specifications  changes during 
each spell.  State dummy variables  (fixed-effects)  are included  in 
the  specifications  to account for unobserved  differences  across 
states that may be correlated with both the generoaity  of the state 
UI system and the character  of unemployment  in the state.  The other 
included variables  are age, race,  education, marital  status and the 
24It is possible  to allow the hazard rate to depend on time (t) 
time until exhaustion  (P 
-  t),  and potential  benefit duration 
because P  is  a time-varying covariate  in this sample.  P  changes 
over the course of many of the spells as extended  or auppiemental 
benefits  begin or expire. 23 
number of dependents. 
Discussion of the Estimates 
The coefficient  estimates from the specifications  are reported 
in Table 2.  Meyer  (1988) provides  a detailed  discussion  of the 
estimates from similar specifications  using this data set.  A 
discussion of the non-UI variable  coefficients  can also be found 
there.  In all of the specifications  tried the UI benefit  level has a 
large negative  effect on the hazard rate.  Specification  1 indicates 
that a ten percent increase  in the  benefit level  is  associated with 
a 5.4 percent decrease  in the hazard.  A strong effect of weeks until 
benefits  lapse is seen from the  exhaustion  spline coefficient 
estimates in Specification  I.  The hazard increasea  94 percent when 
one moves from 5 weeks to 2 weeks before benefits  expire.  In the 
last week the hazard increases  an additional  78 percent. 
Cumulatively,  the hazard more  than triples as  one moves  from g  weeks 
to  1  week before exhaustion. 
Since the  data set we utilize contains  information  on sleeks of 
benefit receipt rather than on actual weeks of unemployment,  an 
institutional  feature of state UI systems could be responsible  for 
some of the  rise in the hazard  found in  the  last week before benefits 
lapse.  In most states there is a cap on the total dollar amount of 
benefits paid  to an individual  during a benefit year.  The cap 
typically depends on an individual's base period earnings.  If this 
cap on total benefit payments  is binding,  an individual  may receive 
smaller benefit payment  in his or her  last week of eligibility.  Sors€ Table  2:  Semiparametric  Hazard  Model Estimates5 





(1  (2) 
UI  benefit  level  104.23  - .0053  - .0040 
(1977 dollars)  (27.91)  (.0014) 
.0026  .0025  Pre-UI weekly  earnings  169.51 
(.0005)  after  taxes  (1977 dollara)  (66.52) 
.0006  .0006  State unemployment  rate  8.70 
(.0002)  (2.08) 
.688 










Age 35-44  .24 
(.079)  (.079) 
.032 
Age 45-54  .14 
(.083)  (.083) 




.036  UI 2-5 
(.062)  (.099) 








- .019  UI  26-40 
(.007)  (.019) 
UI 41-54 
(.138) 
1.578  Benefits  previously  1.537 
(.189)  expected  to lapse  (.188)  - .0247  Potential  duration  -- 
of  benefits  - .0048  Interaction  of  benefit  level 
(.0019)  and Age 17-24 
.0039  Interaction  of  benefit level and 
3  weeks until  exhaustion 
Log Likelihood  value  -8905.1  -8900.6 
5variables  for education,  race, marital 
state dummy  variables  are also included. 
weekly  earnings variables  are in 1977 
asymptotic  standard errors. 
status, number 
The UI  benefit 
dollars.  The 
of  dependents,  and 
level and pre-Ul 
numbers  in parentheses 
11 
are 24 
individuals may not bother to pick up this smaller final check. 
Individuals who remained  unemployed but did not collect their final 
UI benefit would be treated in our hazard model estimates  as  escaping 
from unemployment  in the week before benefits  are exhausted. 
The possibility  that these smaller final payments  could 
spuriously  generate  the  rise in the  hazard just before exhaustion  was 
examined  using an additional dats set.  The data set contains CWBH 
informstion on 38,472 unemployment  spells from 8 states during 1979- 
1984.  The eight states include seven of the  twelve in our subset of 
the CWBH data set previously snalyzed  by Moffitt.  We compared  the 
hazard rate of exit from compensated  unerployment  in the  week before 
regular benefits  lapse when  the  benefit payment was  its  full amount 
and when  it was  reduced because of the cap on total dollar benefits. 
Those who received  Extended Benefits  or Federal Supplemental 
Compensation benefits  were excluded.  For the eight states the hazard 
wss 21 percent higher  (25.7 percent  as  compared  to  21.2 percent)  when 
the last payment was  less than the  full weekly  amount.  While  these 
comparisons  are somewhat crude since we did not control  for  other 
individual  attributes,  they support  the  hypothesis  that a lower 
benefit amount may cause people not to claim their last week of 
benefits.  However, because only s slim majority  of the  final 
payments  are less than the  full amount, this effect could only  cause 
s 12 percent  increase  in the  overall hazard  the week before benefits 
lapse.  Thus, only a small part of the rise in the hazard just before 
exhaustion  could be explained by this phenomenon. 
The estimates  reported  in Table 2 also indicate  that the 25 
probability  of a spell ending is very high in a week  in which 
benefits  were scheduled  to lapse at soae point earlier in a spell. 
One interpretation  of this result is  that some firas' plan  the  tiaing 
of recalls and some workers'  arrange  the  starting of a new job  to 
coincide with  the  end of eligibility  for benefits,  but do not  alter 
these plans in the face of an extension  of benefits.  Alternatively, 
this result could reflect that some people eligible  for extended 
benefits  do not claim them. 
The  estimated effect of the benefit level on the length oi 
unemployment  spells is at the high  end of the distribution  of recent 
estimates.  A consensus  of the previous estimates  of the effect of a 
ten percentage  point increase  in the  replacement  ratio might be a 
one-half  to one  week increase  in the  length of spells.25  Here  the 
estimate  is  around one and one-half weeks.  Larger estimated  effects 
are a plausible result of better data on spell length and  the  level 
and length of benefits.  Many other studies have hsd to impute  the 
level of benefits  for individuals and often it  is not known who  is 
even eligible  for benefits. 
The  sources of variation  in benefit levels in our  data are 
nonlinesrities  in the benefit  schedules  (different minima  and maxima 
across states), legislative  changes during the sample period,  and the 
erosion of real benefit levels due to inflation between  legislative 
changes.  Benefit maxims differ substantially  across states.  For 
example,  the  maximum benefit  in Missouri  is below  the mean benefit  in 
25  -  See  Hsmermesh  (i977)  and  Burtless  (1986)  for  surveys  of 
estimates  based  on  U.S.  data. 26 
Pennsylvania  in our data set.  It is hard  to make a plausible  caae 
for endogeneity  of these soutces of vatiation  given that we are 
controlling  fot the previous wage, as well  as state characteristics 
through the fixed effects.  As a check on the specification  however, 
future work is planned which will concentrate  on variation  in 
benefits  due only to legislative changes. 
Specification  (2)  in Table  2  includes  several additional 
variables.  The potential  duration of benefita  is included  as in the 
original Noffitt  (1983a) paper.  This variable  is  time-varying and 
often increases  from 26 to 39 in the course of a spell as benefits 
are extended.  The entitlement effect captured by Mortensen's  (1977) 
job search model leads to the  prediction  that the  coefficient on 
potential  benefit duration  should be positive when  time until 
exhaustion  is also included  as a covariate.  In fact,  the  coefficient 
estimate  is negative  and substantial  in magnitude,  although  it is  not 
quite significant  at conventional levels.  A negative  coefficient  is 
consistent with  the income effects from more generous benefits 
postulated by Moffitt  and Nicholson  (19g2).  The coefficient  estimate 
implies that a  13 week  extension of benefits  is associated  with a 27 
percent decline in the hazard. 
Two benefit level interaction variables  are also included  in 
Specification  (2).  Benefits  are interacted with the dummy variable 
Age  17-24.  This variable  has  a large and significant negative 
coefficient,  indicating  that the  response of younger people to the 
benefit level is much more elastic.  A larger elasticity for younger 
people was  previously  found in England by Narendranathan  et al. 27 
(1985)  In a specification  not  reported, we also interacted  the 
benefit  level with Age 25-35.  This variable had  a negative 
coefficient, but was small and insignificant. 
An interaction between  the  level of benefits  and time until 
exhaustion  less than or equal  to 3  weeks was also added.  Thia 
coefficient tends to support the hypothesis  of Mortenaen  (1977) that 
higher benefits will  have less of an effect near  exhaustion  (and may 
even raise the  hazard),  but the positive coefficient  ia not quite 
significant. 
Several other specifications  were tried, but are not reported. 
If Specification  (2)  is  estimated without atate fixed effects,  the 
benefit  level coefficient  almost doubles in absolute value  to  .0073 
(standard error .0011), while the estimated  time until exhaustion  and 
potential benefit  duration effects  are  not greatly altered.  The 
exclusion  of fixed effects also causes the  state unemployment  rate to 
change sign while retaining  statistical significance.  It appears 
that higher unemployment  states also tend to have  longer spells, but 
when  the unemployment  rate rises within a given state  the  mean speli 
length drops.  This finding may be  the  result of a composition  effect 
arising from the  greater frequency of short temporary  layoffs in 
downturns.  Other interactions between  the benefit  level and tiae 
until exhaustion were  tried, but they were small and inaignificant. 
Further apecificationa  were estimated which explicitly  accounted 
for the  potential  impact of omitted variables  on the hazard model 
estimates.  These left out variables  are typically called unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Specifications  which allowed unobserved  heterogeneity 28 
with a gamma distribution were  tried.  The signs and statistical 
significance of  the  main coefficients did not change appreciably, but 
the  benefit coefficients  (benefit level, benefit and age  interaction, 
potential  duration  of benefits) rose by about 25 percent. 
V.  Simulating  the Impact of Changes in the  Length and Level of UI 
Sene  fits 
In this section, we simulate the effect of changes in the level 
and length of UI benefits on the duration of unemployment  spells, the 
exhaustion  rate, and the  amount of benefits  paid.  Simulations  are 
useful to better  describe  the  effects of changes  in covariates 
because the transformation  from a change in the  hazard to changes in 
spell length is complex.  The complexity arises from the nonlinearity 
of the  model  and the estimation of a separate  baseline hazard 
parameter  for each  spell length interval.  Simulations also provide  a 
degree of robustness  to unobserved heterogeneity.  One interpretation 
of results presented  in Lancaster  (1985) is that unobserved 
heterogeneity  biases coefficient  estimates toward zero but will have 
little effect on elasticities  of mean duration with respect to 
covariates.26  Our simulations essentially  calculate  these mean 
duration elasticities.  The simulations also allow one  to use the 
entire distribution  of explanatory variables  rather than evaluating 
the  model at  the  mean of the covariates.  Finally,  changes  in  the 
265t•tl  speaking,  Lancaster's result only applies  to an 
uncensored  Weibull model without  time-varying explanatory variables. 29 
amount of benefits  paid and the  exhaustion rate are not  easily 
calculated without simulations. 
The simulations are somewhat  speculative since they only use 
information on the unemployment  spell durations of UI recipients  and 
thereby do not illuminate how changes in UI parameters  may affect 
wages,  the incidence of layoff unemployment or the unemployment 
experience  of non-UI recipients  through possible  displacement 
27 
effects. 
Our simulations  use the actual sample distribution  of the  time- 
invariant  covariaces from our subsample of the Moffitt  data.  The 
parameter  estimates used  in the  simulations are those in Table 2. 
The  simulations assume that state unemployment rate is constant 
during each spell and equal to the  start of spell value  for each 
individual  in the  sample.  It is  assumed that everyone  is eligible 
for 39 weeks  of benefits  (the standard potential  duration  in a period 
in which extended benefits  are triggered).  The moat speculative  part 
of  the  procedure  is making an assumption concerning  behavior  after 
benefits  are  exhausted.  Since the  data set covers only compensated 
unemployment,  one cannot use  it for  inferences concerning post- 
exhaustion  escape rates.  We assume that after exhaustion  the 
baseline  hazard is equal to  the  average baseline  hazard is our sampie 
and that the benefit level is  zero.  The exhaustion  spline  is treated 
as if one is 15 weeks before exhaustion in the  simulations  presented 
27See Burrless  (1987) and Narendranathan  at al.  (1985) for a 
discussion of the difficulties in going from micro estimates  of the 
effect of UI parameters on unemployment duration  to conclusions 
concerning aggregate unemployment. 30 
here.  The rationale  is to avoid the high  escape tate from temporary 
layoffs at the early part of spells and the exhaustion  spike found 
close to  the  exhaustion  point.  Katz and Meyer  (1988) find for  a 
sample of UI recipients  in Missouri  that the  overall hazard  does 
decline substantially  after exhaustion.  This  decline is largely 
accounted  for by an extremely low recall rate after exhaustion.  The 
simulations are not appreciably changed if the exhaustion  spline is 
treated  as  if one who exhausts benefits  has the exhaustion  spline 
values of an individual at 25 weeks befote exhaustion. 
Simulation  Methodolomy 
The next few paragraphs  formally deactibe  the simulation 
methodology.  The key quantity used in  the  aimulations  is  the 
predicted  survivor function  for each individual  in week t, 
conditional  on the individual's covatiates z.(r) up until t.  The 
predicted  survivor  function in week t is the predicted  probability  o 
a spell lasting at least until  t  and it is defined by the equation 
(3)  .(t)  5(tl(t)z(r)';r=0.  t-l)  exp( 




where  a hat  above an expression denotes an estimated quantity.  The 
aggreagate  survivor  function for the sample is then defined by 
I 
N 
(4)  S(t) 
•  N  .(t) 
1=4 31 
where N is the  sample size.  Given the aggregate  survivot  function, 
the predicted mean weeks  of unemployment  is calculated  using  the 
rolling sum which  is  the predicted  weeks of unemployment  accumulated 
by week t. 
t 
(5)  Weeks accumulated by  t s 14(t)  S  SLr) 
r=l 
In all of the simulations N(l04), the number of weeks  accumulated by 
the end of two  yeats, was  calculated.  Since the sum converged 
rapidly the simulation results would not he very different  if we had 
truncated  the sum at 1 or  3  years instead.  Thus, the predicted  mean 
weeks of unemployment  is  defined by N(104). 
Predicted mean weeks  compensated is defined by 14(d),  where d is 
the potential  duration of benefits.  Predicted benefits  paid per 
spell, 3(d) is  defined by 
1  N  d 
(6)  3(d)  -  S 
N  i=l r=l 
where b.  is the UI benefit  for individual i.  Finally,  the  predicted 
percentage  exhausting UI benefits  equals S(d). 
Simulation Results 
Simulations which use  Specification  1  are reported  in Table  3, 
and simulations using  Specification  2  are  reported  in Table 4.  The 
base case scenario predicted  values differ appreciably  for  the  two 32 
simulations, but  the effectsof policy changes are very similar.  The 
base case difference  occurs because the simulations assuae  that 
potential  duration  does not change during the  unemployment  spells, 
while  in the actual Moffitt data the potential duration  benefits 
rises  in the course of many spells as benefits  are extended.  This 
effect is captured  through  the  baseline  hazard estimates  in 
Specification  I rather than directly  in the potential  duration  of 
benefita  coefficient  as  in Specification  2.  Tn both  sets of 
simulations the potential  duration of benefits  is assuaed  to be 
constant  over time, but  in Specification  1 the baseline  hazard 
estimates  implicitly incorpotate increases  in the potential  duration 
of benefits  from extended benefits  triggers turning on during  the 
course of a spell.  Thus the simulations from Specification  2 
presented  in Table 4 probably provide  a better guide to the  mean 
weeks  of unemployment  and benefit payments  to be expected  in each of 
the scenarios. 
We simulated the impact of changes in UI parameters  on the 
predicted mean completed  spell of unemployment  and on the mean weeks 
of compensated unemployment.  Tables  3  and 4 report the following 
policy experiments:  10,  20 and 30 percent reductions  in the level of 
benefits,  and changes in the  potential  duration of benefits  from  39 
to either 35 or 26 weeks.  A change  in maximum potential  benefit 
duration  from 26 to 39 weeks  is exactly the natural policy  experiment 
that occurs when extended benefits  are triggered  in the  United 
States. 
Changes  in  the  level of benefits  and changes in the potential Table 3: Simulations  Using Specification (1) in Table 2 
(The numbers in parentheses are 
percentage changes from the base case) 
Predicted 
Predicted  Predicted  Benefits  Predicted 
Mean Weeks of  Mean Weeks  Paid Per  Percentage 
Scenario  Unemployment  Compensated  Spell  Exhausting 
Base Case (39 weeks)  18.4  16.6  $ 1796  12.9 
Benefit  Level Reduced 10%  16.9  15.5  1503  10.4 
(-8.2)  (-6.6)  (-16.3)  (-19.4) 
Benefit Level Reduced 20%  15.4  14.4  1236  8.2 
(-16.3)  (-13.3)  (-31.2)  (-36.4) 
Benefit Level Reduced 30%  14.1  13.3  996  6.3 
(-23.4)  (-19.9)  (-44.5)  (-51.2) 
Potential Benefit Duration  17.6  15.7  1690  14.6 
Reduced to 35 weeks  (-4.3)  (-5.4)  (-5.9)  (13.2) 
Potential Benefit Duration  16.2  13.6  1461  20.7 
Reduced to 26 weeks  (-12.0)  (-18.0)  (-18.7)  (60.5) Table 4:  Simulations  Using Specification (2)  in Table 2 
(The  numbers in parentheses are 
percentage changes from the base case) 
Predicted 
Predicted  Predicted  Benefits  Predicted 
Mean Weeks of  Mean Weeks  Paid Per  Percentage 
Scenario  Unemployment  Compensated  Spell  Exhausting 
Base Case (39 weeks)  14.7  13.5  $ 1455  9.0 
Benefit Level Reduced 10%  13.5  12.5  1215  7.2 
(-8.2)  (-7.4)  (-16.5)  (-20.0) 
Benefit Level Reduced 20%  12.4  11.6  999  5.7 
(-15.6)  (-14.1)  (-31.3)  (-36.7) 
Benefit Level Reduced 30%  11.3  10.8  807  4.4 
(-23.1)  (-20.0)  (-44.5)  (-51.1) 
Potential Benefit Duration  13.9  12.8  1376  9.8 
Reduced to 35 weeks  (-5.4)  (-5.2)  (-5.4)  (8.9) 
Potential Benefit Duration  12.6  11.4  1222  13.4 
Reduced to 26 weeks  (-14.3)  (-15.6)  (-16.0)  (51.1) 33 
length of benefits have  substantial effects on the aean duration  of 
unemployment  of UI recipients.  The two  sets of simulations  provide 
quite similar estimates of  the  impact of policy changea.  An incteaae 
in the potential  duration of benefits from 26 to 39 weeks  is 
predicted  to raise the mean unemployment  spell duration  by 2.1 weeks 
in both simulations.  This is a surprisingly  large effect given that 
most spells are completed well before the  26 weeks of regular 
benefits run out.  An increase in potential benefit duration  will 
mechanically  increase  the mean compensated  spell duration  even  if 
benefits  have no incentive effect since previously  uncompensated 
unemployment  will be classified as compensated unemployment.  The 
predicted  effect of an extension of benefits  from 26 weeks to 39 
weeks  if there are no incentive effects from extending benefits 
(using Specification  2)  is  a 0.9 week increase  in mean compenaated 
spell duration.  Thus most of the  impact of extended  benefits  on 
compensated unemployment  arises through  the  negative  effects of UI on 
the escape  rate from unemployment. 
We conclude  from an examination of a variety of simulated  changea 
in potential  benefit durations  that a  one  week  extension of banefira 
increases  the  mesn duration  of an unemployment  spell by approximately 
0.16 to 0.20 weeks.  One caveat in interpreting  these estimates  is 
thst much of  the  variation  in the  potential  length of benefits  atiaes 
from the extension  of benefits  in times  of poot macroeconomic 
conditions.  Tf the time-varying state unemployment tate variable 
included  in our specifications  does not fully capture labor market 
conditions,  then part of the  our estimate  of the  increase in the 34 
duration  of unemployment  from an increase  in potential  benefit 
duration may  aimply reflect that potential benefit duration  is high 
when job  availability  is  low.  However, the estimated  effects of UI 
are corroborated by Specification  1 which does not use this source of 
variation  in the  UI parameters  and still gives similar results. 
Our estimates of  the  impact of potential  benefit duration  on the 
average unemployment  spell duration  of UI recipients  are s bit larger 
than most  of those in the  literature.  Our estimates  are slightly 
larger than Moffitt's  (1985a) estimate of 0.15 weeks from a model 
that does not  include state dummy variables.  Hoffitt and Nicholson 
(1982) find using  a static labor supply estimation  framework  that s 
one week extension  raises the  average unemployment  duration  by 0.10 
week.  Noffitt and Nicholson's  sample includes only UI recipients  who 
had exhausted  their regular benefits,  and their measure of 
unemployment  includes both compensated and uncompensared 
unemployment.  It seems plausible  that a group of largely  "long- 
term" unemployed workers,  such as the sample analyzed  by Hoffitt and 
Nicholson, may be less sensitive to benefits  than a more 
representative  group of UI recipients such as  in the  data set we 
examine.  In a study of Canadian UI recipients, Ham and Res  (1987) 
find that s one week  increase  in the  duration of benefits  increases 
the  mean duration  to the start of a new job by 0.26-0.33 weeks  in a 
competing risks framework.28 
The hypothetical  UI parameter changes examined  in the simulations 
28Since some of  the  spells in their sample end in recall, it is 
difficult  to  translate this finding into an estimate  of the effect on 
the mean  duration of unemployment. 35 
have  substantial effects on the amount of benefits  paid per  spell.  A 
reduction  in the  level of benefits  by 10 percent has an impact on the 
UI budget  similar  to a reduction  in the  potential  duration  of 
benefits  from 39  to  26 weeks.  The simulations  indicate that 
increases in potential benefit duration have much larger adverse 
incentive effects on unemployment  than do chmnges in the  level of 
benefits  that have the same effect on the UI budget.  The  simulations 
in Table 4 show that the budget cut from the base  case accomplished 
through s 10 percent reduction  in benefits  reduces mean unemployment 
by  1.2  weeks, while a similar budget cut done through eliminating 
extended benefirs  generstes  almost twice as large a reduction  in 
unemployment. 
These  findings  suggest that a government with  a fixed UI budget 
faces s sharp trade-off between incentives and  insurance in the 
design of the level and time sequence of UI payments.  A balanced 
budget reduction  in the  level and increase  in the  maximum duration  of 
benefits  has strong adverse incentive effecra although  it does 
provide grester protection  for those who  are  unlucky  in their 
attempts to gain reemployment.  The theoretical  results of Shavell 
and Weiss  (1979) concerning  the  optimal design of a UI system subject 
to e fixed UI budget combined with our findings  of strong behavioral 
effects of UI on the rate of reemployment suggest that a system of 
high benefits  with limited duration may be preferable  to  one  with 
lower benefits  of longer duration. 36 
The Impacts of Extended  Benefits  on the Income of the  Unemployed 
Broadly,  our results suggest thst the behavioral  effects of Ut 
sre extremely  important.  In fact,  the estimated  incentive effects of 
extended benefits  are large enough to allow the  possibility  that 
benefit extensions  could actually reduce the  total money  income of 
UI recipients.  If the benefit extension did not affect  the  duration 
of unemployment  or reemployment  earnings, then increasing  the  weeks 
of unemployment  in which benefits  are  received would unambiguously 
raise the income of  the  unemployed.  On the other hand,  if a higher 
duration of benefits  increases unemployment duration  and does nor 
affect reemployment wages, the extension of benefits  may reduce the 
income (although probably not  the  welfare) of UI recipients  if 
reemployment wages  are  higher  than UI benefits. 
The following  simple calculations are  instructive concerning  the 
incentive effects of increases  in benefit duration.  The simulations 
presented  in Table  4 imply that an increase  in benefit duration  from 
26 to 39 weeks  raises the unemployment  income of typical UI 
recipients by $223  (from $1222 to  $1455  in 1977 dollars).  If one 
assumes that there are no behavioral  effects of extending benefits, 
i.e.  the  distribution  of spells is unchanged,  then the analogous 
figure is $98.29  The overall impact of this increase  in potential 
benefit duration on  the  income of the  typical UI recipient  may be 
assessed under  alternative assumptions about reemployment  wages.  We 
make the strong assumption  that reemployment weekly wages are 
29This calculations  assumes rhar the escape rare from 
unemployment  after 26 weeks  is the  same as  it would be if benefits 
had not been extended. 37 
unaffected  by the availability of extended benefits.  Under this 
assumption, the change in a UI recipient's money  income arising from 
the extension of benefits  is  given by the formula: 
A Income = 
C  A(Weeks of  compensated  unemployment)  * (Weekly  UI benefit) 
- 
C  A(Total Weeks of  unemployment) * (Reemployment  weekly wage)) 
In Table 5,  we present the predicted impact on the income of a UI 
recipient  (with pre-Ul weekly  earnings equal to our  sample average of 
$170) of an increase in potential benefit duration  from 26  to  39 
weeks.  We use the simulations discussed  above based on 
specifications  (1)  and  (2)  from Table 2.  We consider  three oases for 
each specification.  The first case assumes there are no behavioral 
effects of extended benefits.  The second case assumes  that extended 
benefits  increase unemployment by the amounts shown  in out simulation 
results (in Tables 3 and 4)  and that reemployment wages are 90 
percent of pte-UI weekly wages.  The final case assumes  these same 
behavioral  effects on the duration of unemployment,  but assumes that 
reemployment wages are only 60 percent of pre-Ul weekly wages.  Katz 
and Meyer  (1988) find that the  typical UI recipient  who gains 
teemployment within a year  of layoff has  (initial) reemployment 
weekly earnings  that ste  approximately  10 percent  less than pta-UI 
weekly earnings.  On the  other hand,  those who were not recalled  and 
exhausted benefits  averaged 50 percent losses in weekly earnings. 
The calculations presented  in Table 5 suggest that extending 
benefits  may reduce the  total money income of UI recipients.  If one Table  5: The Effect of An  Increase in  Potential  Benefit Dutation 
from 26 to 39 Weeks  on  the Income of  a Typical 
UI Recipient 
Change  in  Change in  Net Change 
Scenario  Unemployment  Income  Wage Income  in Income 
Specification  (1) 
from Table  2 
No  behavioral  $179  $  0  $ 179 
effects of UI 
Behavioral 
Effects: 
Reemployment weekly  336  -337  -1 
wage equals  90% 
of  pre-UT weekly 
earnings 
Reemployment  weekly 
wage  equals  60%  336  -225  111 
of  pre-Ul weekly 
earnings 
Specification  (2) 
from Table 2 
No  behavioral  $ 98  $  0  $  98 
effects of UT 
Behavioral 
Effects: 
Reemployment weekly  223  -321  -98 
wage equals  90% 
of  pre-UT weekly 
earnings 
Reemployment weekly 
wage  equals  60%  223  -214  9 
of  pre-UT  weekly 
earnings 
These calculations  assume  a pre-Ul weekly  wage  of  $170.  All figures are in 
1977 dollars.  The change  in income of  a UI recipient arising  from  the 
extension of  benefits  is given by the formula: 
4 Income = )  4(Weeks  of  compensated  unemployment)  * (Weekly  UI  benefit) 
-  )  a(Total Weeks of  unemployment)  * (Reemployment  weekly  wage)) 38 
assumes that reemployment  earnings ste 90 percent of ptevious 
earnings, then both specifications yield  the  ptediction  that the 
income of  the  typical UI recipient actually  falls in response  to an 
increase in potential  benefit duration  from 26 to 39 weeka.  If 
workers whose behavior  is most strongly affected  by extended henefita 
have low reemployment wages, then it  is likely that extended benefits 
raise the money  income of UI recipients.  Of course, these 
calculations  ignore the  increases in leisure accruing  ro Ut 
recipients  from greater unemployment  and do not  take into account  the 
possibility that extended benefits  may allow workers  to make better 
job matches raising future earnings from employment.  If a longer 
durstion of benefits  allows workers to find higher  paying jobs  and 
these jobs  last for even several months, then extended  benefits  are 
likely to  raise the  income of the  unemployed. 
VI.  Conclusions 
The evidence  presented  in this  paper  indicates  that the  potential 
duration of UI benefits  has  a strong impact on the  duration of  the 
unemployment spells of UI recipients in the United  States.  Our 
examination of data from the PSID indicates  that the distributions  of 
unemployment  spell durstions  of UI recipients  and nonrecipients  are 
quite different.  Substantial increases in both the recall rare and 
new job finding rate are apparent  for  UI recipients  around the time 
when benefits  are likely to  lapse.  Large increases  in the eacape 
rate from unemployment  in the  several weeks before exhaustion  are 39 
also apparent  for a large sample of UI tecipients for which 
administrative  data allows us  to accurately date  the  end of the spell 
and the point at which benefits  are exhausted.  Katz and Meyer  (1988) 
report similar increases  in the  hazard rate near exhaustion  for 
another sample of UI recipients.  It seems safe  to conclude  that 
potential benefit  duration has  significant behavioral  effects on firm 
recall policies  and worker new job finding strategies.  Furthermore, 
our estimates  indicate  that policies  that extend benefits  have much 
greater adverse incentive  effects on the  duration  of unemployment 
than policies with  the same predicted  impact on  the  government  budget 
which raise the level of benefits. 
Our results indicate  that a one week  increase  in potential 
benefit duration  increases  the  average duration of  the  unerployment 
spells of UI recipients by about 0.16 to 0.20 weeks.  These estimates 
can be used guardedly  to make a rough guess as  to what  the  impact of 
longer potential benefit  durations in Europe than in the United 
States is on the mean duration  of unemployment.  An increase  in 
potential benefit  duration  from six months  to one year  is predicted 
to  increase mean duration  of unemployment by 4 to  5  weeks, and  an 
increase from six months  to two years is  predicted  to generate  a  13 
to  16 week  increase in unemployment duration,  The  average 
uncompleted  duration  of ongoing spells was 68.2 weeks  in the United 
Kingdom  in 1984 versus  18 weeks in the  United States  (Lsyard and 
Mickell,  1986).  The  fraction of the  unemployed  covered by benefits 40 
is also much  lower in the  United States than in the United Kingdom.30 
Thus, longer duration of benefits may be able  to explain about 10 to 
30 percent of the difference  in mean unemployment  spell durations 
between the United States and the  United Kingdom. 
Two caveats about our results should be kept  in mind.  First, 
while  lower unemployment  benefits might decrease  the length of UI 
recipients'  spells,  the  spells of non-UI recipients  might rise due  to 
congestion/displacement  effects.  If aggregate  employment  is 
determined by the level of demand, and the marching  of particular 
workers to jobs  is not  important, shorter unemployment  spells for ono 
group would imply longer spells on average for others.  This effect 
would imply that our estimates of the  microeconomic  effects of UI on 
unemployment  are sn overestimate of the  macroeconomic  effects. 
Second, we have concentrated  on transitions  in one direction  between 
only Iwo of the possible  labor market states.  Clark and Summers 
(1982)  and Topel  (1985) have emphasized the  effects of UI on other 
transitions.  A more encompassing analysis  of the effects of UI on 
the labor market might yield different conclusions  about the 
aggregste  effects of changes in the  level and length of UI benefits. 
30Blank and Card  (1988) and Kane  (1988) document  the  recent 
decline in the fraction of  the  unemployed  receiving UI in rho U.S. 
and examine alternative  explanations for this phenomenon. 41 
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Table Al:  Empirical  Hazards for UI Recipients 
PSID Data,  2 Week Escape Rates 
# of Escapes  Empirical  Hazards 
Weeks  Risk 
Unemployed  Set  Recall  New Job  Total  Recall  New Job 
1-2  703  135  8  0.2034  0.1920  0.0114 
3-4  560  68  16  0.1500  0.1214  0.0286 
5-6  476  28  8  0.0756  0.0588  0.0168 
7-8  440  29  20  0.1114  0.0659  0.0455 
9-10  391  16  11  0.0691  0.0409  0.0281 
11-12  364  22  12  0.0934  0.0604  0.0330 
13-14  329  19  9  0.0851  0.0578  0.0274 
15-16  290  15  13  0.0966  0.0517  0.0448 
17-18  260  5  12  0.0654  0.0192  0.0462 
19-20  222  11  10  0.0946  0.0495  0.0450 
21-22  198  5  6  0.0556  0.0253  0.0303 
23-24  174  3  8  0.0632  0.0172  0.0460 
25-26  159  14  18  0.2013  0.0881  0.1132 
27-28  117  4  0  0.0342  0.0342  0.0000 
29-30  113  3  13  0.1416  0.0265  0.1150 
31-32  91  0  1  0.0110  0.0000  0.0110 
33-34  86  0  3  0.0349  0.0000  0.0349 
35-36  79  1  5  0.0759  0.0127  0.0633 
37-38  66  1  1  0.0303  0.0152  0.0152 
39-40  62  4  7  0.1774  0.0645  0.1129 
41-42  47  0  1  0.0213  0.0000  0.0213 
43-44  44  2  1  0.0682  0.0455  0.0227 
45-46  40  0  1  0.0250  0.0000  0.0250 
47-48  39  0  0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
49-50  37  0  2  0.0541  0.0000  0.0541 
51-52  33  0  4  0.1212  0.0000  0.1212 
53-54  21  0  1  0.0476  0.0000  0.0476 
55-56  20  0  1  0.0500  0.0000  0.0500 
57-58  17  0  0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
59-60  16  0  1  0.0625  0.0000  0.0625 Table A2:  Empirical Hazards  for UI Nonrecipients 
PSID Data, 2 Week Escape Rates 
# of Escapes  Empirical  Hazards 
Weeks  Risk 
Unemployed  Set  Recall  New Job  Total  Recall  New Job 
1-2  412  66  22  0.2136  0.1602  0.0534 
3-4  324  41  23  0.1975  0.1265  0.0710 
5-6  260  16  7  0.0885  0.0615  0.0269 
7-8  237  14  14  0.1181  0.0591  0.0591 
9-10  209  7  5  0.0574  0.0335  0.0239 
11-12  196  13  7  0.1020  0.0663  0.0357 
13-14  175  8  5  0.0743  0.0457  0.0286 
15-16  156  8  6  0.0897  0.0513  0.0385 
17-18  138  4  5  0.0652  0.0290  0.0362 
19-20  125  1  1  0.0160  0.0080  0.0080 
21-22  119  2  2  0.0336  0.0168  0.0168 
23-24  108  6  4  0.0926  0.0556  0.0370 
25-26  96  2  5  0.0729  0.0208  0.0521 
27-28  74  0  1  0.0135  0.0000  0.0135 
29-30  72  1  0  0.0139  0.0139  0.0000 
31-32  67  0  1  0.0149  0.0000  0.0149 
33-34  65  1  0  0.0154  0.0154  0.0000 
35-36  63  0  1  0.0159  0.0000  0.0159 
37-38  61  0  0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
39-40  59  1  2  0.0508  0.0169  0.0339 
41-42  52  0  0  0.0000  0.0000  00000 
43-44  52  2  0  0.0385  0.0385  0.0000 
45-46  48  0  0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
47-48  48  0  1  0.0208  0.0000  0.0208 
49-50  45  1  0  0.0222  0.0222  0.0000 
51-52  44  0  1  0.0227  0.0000  0.0227 
53-54  32  0  0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
55-56  32  0  0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
57-58  32  0  0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
59-60  32  0  0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 